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United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Some Win-Win Applications1
Paul F Diehl and Chetan Kumar
International intervention in a dispute almost by definmon results from a failure to resolve underlying sources 
of conflict at a lower level Indeed the United Nations is authorized to address only those disputes that threaten 
international peace and security There are various mechanisms available^ to the United Nations for dealing 
with such threats Yet most do not involve solutions in which all the protagonists benefit from the outcome
Typically the United Nations will begin its mtervenuon by calling for a cease fire and sometimes labelling 
one side or the other as the aggressor Recommended solutions including negotiations and international 
adjudication structure the outcome so as to constitute a partial or complete zero-sum game Collective security 
actions in which the international community aids an innocent state victim of aggression are designed to 
satisfy the interests of one protagonist at the expense of the other the recent international action m support of 
Kuwait is indicative of this Perhaps not surprisingly then intervention by the United Nations has been 
relatively infrequent and actually declined in effectiveness after 1970 through the early 1980s (Haas 1986)
Without that international intervention antagonists usually face one of four sets of joint outcomes to their 
conflict (a) The parties could arrive at a Pareto-optimum solution in which none of the sides comes out worse 
off and at least one side comes out better off (b) they might obtain a Pareto-malium solution in which none of 
the disputants is better off and one of the sides is worse off (c) they might be in a situation in which at least 
one side is better off but other sides are worse off or (d) they might be stuck in a lose lose situation in which 
all sides come out worse off In the absence of a quick victory the disputants are unlikely to arrive at a win 
lose outcome A protracted and violent struggle between disputants with seemingly irreconcilable preferences 
(the kind of struggle most likely to prompt international mtervenuon) will probably not lead to a solution (if 
one is indeed found) that leaves both sides better off
Despite its overall mixed record of success the United Nations offers the basis for mtemaüonal mtervenuon 
under which all sides might be better off peacekeeping In this paper we analyze the potential of U N  
peacekeeping for generating win wm soluüons to mtemaüonal disputes Thus we are not concerned with 
peacekeeping roles that might lead to Pareto-malium win lose or lose lose solutions Rather we consider a 
particular kind of optimum solution in which all sides are better off We explore when U N peacekeeping 
operations might help establish peace where none previously existed or provide the mechanism for cooperative 
actions by conflicting parties In these ways U N  peacekeeping forces might be introduced so that the 
disputants might escape the traditional outcomes of international conflict and end up better off than under other 
proposed solutions
We begin by describing the peacekeeping option and reviewing past applications We then specify 
conditions that favor wm wm solutions m peacekeeping We conclude by analyzing several U N  peacekeeping 
roles that may lead to wm win solutions references to contemporary conflicts are provided
The Concept of United Nations Peacekeeping
The term peacekeeping” has been popularly used to designate a wide range of phenomena. The troops that 
participated in the invasion of Grenada were called the Caribbean Peace Keeping Forces ” President Reagan 
even labeled the MX missile the ‘Peacekeeper ” Most commonly peacekeeping is used to refer to any 
international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the 
resolution of a long standing dispute Such a definition encompasses military action to punish an aggressor
 ^ A version of this paper will appear in Stuart Nagel (ed ) Resolving International Disputes Through Win Wm or SOS Solutions The 
authors would like to thank Stuart Nagel and Jeremiah Sullivan for their comments and suggestions
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The various approaches to peace at the disposal of the Security Council are provided in Articles 33 51 of the United Nations 
Charter
5such as the Korean police action ” as well as multilateral efforts at negotiation In many cases the use of the 
term seems to contradict the whole notion of *peace ” much less that such a condition should be preserved or 
kept”
The United Nations itself has no established definition of peacekeeping Nevertheless the International 
Peace Academy an organization devoted to study of ways to improve peacekeeping offers some reasonable 
parameters for use of the term the prevention containment, moderation and termination of hostilities 
through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally using 
multinational forces of soldiers police and civilians to restore and maintain peace ” (quoted m Rikhye 
Harbottle and Egge 1974 11)
Peacekeeping has certain unique attributes that distinguish it from other forms of international intervention 
One distinguishing attribute of peacekeeping is the performance of a non-coercive mission In contrast, troops 
trained in traditional military maneuvers work to restore order defend a given piece o f territory or seize and hold 
that piece of territory The general goal of a traditional military operation is to deter an opponent or defeat that 
opponent in battle should deterrence fail these are missions that include enforcement and coercion with military 
force
Peacekeeping operations are significantly different in several ways First, peacekeeping troops are not 
designed to restore order or stop the fighting between rival armies Peacekeeping troops are usually deployed 
following a cease fire agreement by the protagonists They are not constituted for the mission of stopping 
bloodshed on a battlefield Thus unlike a collective security operation peacekeeping troops are traditionally 
deployed as an interposition force after fighting is halted rather than pnor to or during military conflict
Peacekeeping forces also have the distinguishing feature of being lightly armed. A typical peacekeeping 
soldier is equipped with only a nfle and peacekeeping units have access only to vehicles for transportation 
purposes (eg  helicopters personnel earners etc ) and not to those primarily intended for offensive military 
action (e g tanks fighter planes etc ) Although the military personnel of some poorer countries in the world 
might also have no more than nfles on their backs peacekeeping troops are inherently restricted as such by a 
guiding philosophy rather than by economic or technological underdevelopment Peacekeeping troops are 
lightly armed because their mission is non traditional they are designed to use those arms only in self defense 
peacekeeping troops have neither an offensive military mission nor the capability for one Peacekeeping troops 
are not designed to alter the prevailing distribution of power in the area of their deployment nor do they seek to 
appear threatening to the disputants or the local populauon
A third distinguishing conceptual component of peacekeeping is its neutrality A collective enforcement 
operation presupposes that there is an identifiable aggressor the target of enforcement action in this case there 
must be a determination of the victim and the guilty party by the United Nations or some other intemauonal 
agency Peacekeeping forces do not brand one side or the other as responsible for the military conflict that they 
seek to mitigate
Neutrality encompasses more than just the purpose of the force The composition and activities of the 
troops also are impartial in character Most U.N peacekeeping forces are composed of personnel from non 
aligned states typically Canada, Fiji and Sweden have been among the most generous contributors of troops 
Soldiers from the major powers or those from other states with a vested interest in the conflict at hand (e g 
Saudi Arabia in Middle East operations) are explicitly not used In contrast, one could hardly imagine an 
effective collective enforcement operation without the active participation of the major military powers Yet, a 
similar contribution to peacekeeping jeopardizes its neutral character and perhaps its likelihood of success
A final feature of peacekeeping operations is that states on whose territory the troops will be stationed must 
give permission A parallel requirement in collective enforcement operations (needing the permission of the 
aggressor to undertake military actions against it) would be absurd Peacekeeping operations recognize and 
respect the sovereignty of states and are assigned roles commensurate with the authority granted by the states 
involved The absence of permission would jeopardize the mission of a peacekeeping operation It is likely that 
any attempt to station troops in a country without its consent would precipitate military attacks on those forces 
by the host country Not only would this defeat the purpose of limiting hostilities but it would be suicidal for
the peacekeeping troops in that they have neither the military equipment nor the training to resist the actions of 
a well armed and determined enemy Intervention without consent, under most scenarios would also violate 
international legal standards (see Garvey 1970)
Thus peacekeeping mvolves the stationing of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a 
cessation of armed hostilities with the permission of the state on whose territory they are deployed m order to 
discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment suitable for resolving the underlying 
dispute
Previous Applications of the U N Peacekeeping Strategy
Despite the apparent attractiveness of the peacekeeping option and the limited consensus in the Security Council 
needed for its exercise there have been only nine peacekeeping operations since 1945 3 These are listed in Table 1
Table 1 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
Operation Dates
United Nations Emergency Force—I (UNEF I) 1956 1967
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960 1964
Umted Nations Security Force m West New Guinea (UNSF) 1962 1963
United Nations Peacekeeping Force m Cyprus (UNFICYP) 1964 present
Umted Nations Emergency Force—II (UNEF II) 1973 1979
Umted Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) 1974 present
Umted Nations Interim Force m Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1978 present
Umted Nations TransiUon Assistance Group (UNTAG) 1989 1990
Umted Nations Transnational Authority m Cambodia (UNTAC) 1991 present
Source United Nations (1990)
Despite being few in number U.N peacekeeping operations have been employed in several different types 
of situations Most commonly U.N peacekeeping forces have been deployed to prevent a senous situation 
from expanding to a full scale war or if war has occurred to prevent an expansion to other participants The 
U.N force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was put in place in order to head off a confrontation between Greek and 
Turkish commumues on the island as well as deter external intervention by Greece and Turkey Similarly the 
second stage of the U.N Emergency Force (UNEFII) was a part of the cease fire agreement ending the 1973 
Yom Kippur War thereby lessenmg the likelihood of superpower intervention and possible direct confrontation
Beyond those situations U N  peacekeeping troops have been sent to internationalized civil wars such as in 
the Congo (ONUC) and Lebanon (UNIFTL) Their purposes were to secure the withdrawal of foreign forces 
from the areas involved and promote long term internal stability The most recent peacekeeping operations 
represent something of a change for U.N operations The mandates for the operations in Namibia (UNTAG) 
and Cambodia (UNTAC) include provisions for monitoring democratic elections a largely new form of 
peacekeeping
Information is current as of January 2 1992 In addition to peacekeeping operations there have been 11 peace observation 
missions earned out by the United Nations since 1945 (United Nations 1990) Peace observation differs from peacekeeping in 
that observer forces are usually smaller (one individual can constitute a force) are not even lightly armed and do not carry out all 
of the same duues including acting as an interposition force A complete review of all peacekeeping and observation missions 
including those before 1945 is contained in James (1990a)
7Despite the variety of situations in which peacekeeping troops have been used, their absence was notable in 
Cold War disputes To some extent, this may be because the superpowers have used the Security Council veto 
to block any U N actions that they disfavored.4 Yet the United Nations has traditionally ignored most conflicts 
with a direct involvement between the superpowers (e g the Berlin Crises) or played a minimal role (e g 
Cuban Missile Crisis) Proxy conflicts between the superpowers (e g Angola and some Middle East conflicts) 
have only prompted U.N intervention when the prospects of direct superpower intervention would have entailed 
high costs Otherwise U.N peacekeeping has stayed at the periphery of the international security system One 
might expect, however that the end of the Cold War might facilitate the use of peacekeeping troops in 
situations heretofore precluded by superpower tensions
Previous U.N peacekeeping operations except for the most recent two have followed the traditional roles 
outlined in the previous section Each was a band aid put in place following a cease fire with the hope that 
peaceful and successful negotiations would follow Despite calls for a permanent U.N peacekeeping force and 
proposals for the use of peacekeeping forces in unconvenuonal roles the basic ad hoc U.N peacekeeping 
operation has remained largely unchanged
The overall record of U.N peacekeeping operations is one of mixed success One can evaluate peacekeeping 
success according to the operation s ability to (1) limit armed conflict and (2) promote conflict resolution 
(Diehl 1988) Using these two entena several operations can be considered successful in limiting violence in 
the area of deployment, although to varying degrees For example the Golan Heights have been quiet ova* the 
past two decades of United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) deployment Similarly there 
have been few serious incidents except for the 1974 Turkish invasion on Cyprus
With respect to the second criterion of success only UNEFII might be said to have achieved some measure 
of conflict resolution The stability offered by UNEF II provided an environment conducive to the signing of 
the Camp David accords By the time UNEF II was withdrawn in 1979 the prospect of another war between 
Israel and Egypt was significantly reduced More typically U N  peacekeeping operations have lingered for 
years incapable of being withdrawn for fear of renewed fighting (i e violence is abated, but without resolving 
the underlying conflict) The operations in Cyprus and Lebanon continue today testaments to the seeming 
intractability of their respective circumstances
If one accepts a less stringent and more ambiguous criterion that peacekeeping operations be judged merely 
against the option of total inaction then all U.N peacekeeping operations might be considered successful (even 
the widely dended UN1F1L operation) Indeed there are positive results from U N  peacekeeping but few if 
any achieved what might be called win win solutions
The reasons that U N peacekeeping operations are not all successful are complex Several factors involve 
the authorization and conduct of the operations themselves Frequently a vague mandate or poor logistics 
(Mackinlay 1989) complicate a peacekeeping mission as can difficult geographic terrain for patrols (Diehl 
1988) Yet certain other factors prevent U N peacekeeping from achieving better net outcomes Most 
prominent are the non-cooperation of third parties to the conflict and the perceived partiality of peacekeeping 
troops (Diehl 1988 Nelson 1984) For both of these reasons various protagonists often do not believe that 
their interests are served by the presence of peacekeeping troops For example Israel felt that UNIFTL (and the 
United Nations in general) was biased toward the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) not surprisingly 
Israel took matters into its own hands in 1982 smashing through UNIFTL lines in its invasion of Lebanon
Overall the record of U N peacekeeping is a reasonably good one Yet, peacekeeping has been applied 
only a few times over the past fifty years and while somewhat successful there is much room for improvement 
In order for U.N peacekeeping to offer win win solutions for international disputes two modifications of 
existing practices are necessary First U.N peacekeeping operations must be deployed only in circumstances
4 It is possible to bypass the Security Council by having the General Assembly assume some responsibility for peace and security 
affairs The police action in Korea and the deployment of the first peacekeeping operation (UNEF I) were achieved through 
General Assembly Nevertheless over the past three decades this practice has declined and the Security Council has reasserted 
its primary responsibility for peace and security affairs
8that maximize the cooperation of the protagonists and the perceived neutrality of the U.N troops This means 
that peacekeeping is not necessarily a strategy that is appropriate for all threats to international peace and 
security Second, new redes (beyond those of a traditional interposition force following a cease fire) need to be 
devised to enhance the prospects that the use of U.N troops will result in a situation in which all sides might 
be better off This involves more creative thinking in applying the peacekeeping strategy rather than a 
fundamental overhaul of peacekeeping forces We address these concerns and provide contemporary examples in 
the following two sections
Conditions Favorable for Win Win Solutions
Although peacekeeping troops may continue to be used in a variety of situations the prospects for their use in 
achieving win win solutions are best only under limited conditions Below we discuss ceteris panbus the 
general environment under which success is most probable 5
The first set of conditions relates to the kind of dispute First, win wm outcomes are most likely to occur 
in an interstate dispute as opposed to a civil or internationalized civil war (Nwafor 1970) There are several 
reasons for this In the case of a civil war the peacekeeping operation may inherently favor the interests of the 
challenged government A cease fire tends to favor the protagonist that benefits the most from the continuation 
of the status quo For example after pressure on the challenged government is relieved it may wm some 
political support from a populace longing for stability In addition the ruling elites retain control during the 
penod of peacekeeping deployment, finally there is little incentive for the challenged government to grant 
concessions in negotiations or create conditions under which peacekeeping forces can be withdrawn From the 
viewpoint of rebel groups in an intrastate conflict the peacekeeping operation offers the benefits of stopping the 
fighting but puts rebel groups at a political disadvantage m future efforts to overthrow the government 
Conversely an interstate conflict offers greater potential that all sides might benefit from a freezing of the status 
quo brought about by the peacekeeping forces
In addition bord»’ disputes might be conducive for peacekeeping operations that lead to wm win solutions 
This may seem suipnsing at first glance given that territorial disputes appear zero-sum (i e only one side can 
control a given piece of territory) Yet acquisition of tern tory through military force is difficult and relatively 
rare only eight percent of all tern tonal changes have been achieved through military means since 1945 (Goertz 
and Diehl 1992) The stationing of peacekeeping troops m a disputed area provides a solution that prevents one 
or both sides from coming out worse off by virtue of a fruitless confrontation over the area Peacekeeping 
troops reduce the possibility of a militarized dispute and thereby ensure that neither side is worse off because of 
losses from such a dispute Furthermore none of the protagonists would have to fear the loss of strategic 
advantage from a possible unilateral cease fire
The second set o f conditions concerns the protagonists Peacekeeping forces are more likely to promote 
win wm solutions in instances of dyadic disputes than in multiparty confrontations The reconciliation of two 
disputants preferences is difficult enough Aggregating the preferences of multiple states and actors may be all 
but impossible in such a way that all come out ahead In the case of peacekeeping this means that conflicts 
such as the Arab Israeli one will be difficult to solve through peacekeeping (or any other approach) because of 
multiple actors involved
The third condition relates to the military and political relationship between the disputants The 
assumption is that wm wm solutions are most likely in conflicts between disputants of approximately equal 
power It is under these circumstances that a win lose solution is less likely unless the status quo 
circumstances strongly favors one side or the other Among relatively equal actors the prospects that one side 
or the other can achieve its respective desired outcome through military force is limited The imposition of 
peacekeeping forces provides several benefits for the protagonists that allows them to escape a stalemate First, 
it stops the fighting and ongomg losses Second peacekeeping offers insurance against future losses Third it
5 There are of course some inherent costs and nsks for states that have peacekeeping forces on their soil See James (1990b)
9offers a face saving way out of the dispute for all sides Finally it allows the claims of all parties to be retained 
for later negotiation and mediabon
Finally peacekeeping operations offer the best chance as a win-win application when they facilitate conflict 
resolution (for example see the discussion on election supervision below) rather than being a solution in 
themselves We noted above that peacekeeping operations do not have a good track record in resolving 
underlying conflict, although they are effective in mitigating the most violent manifestations of that conflict 
Although peacekeeping may not constitute a wm win solution m the formulation stage of the policy process 
peacekeeping may lead to one in the implementation phase As neutral entmes peacekeeping troops can 
provide the assurance of a fair implementation of an agreement, rather than requiring that disputants rely on the 
good faith of their opponents
Thus peacekeeping forces have the best opportunity to implement wm wm solutions for international 
disputes that are dyadic interstate mvolve equally matched protagonists and deal with bord»-areas 
Nevertheless the successful use of peacekeeping troops m such circumstances requires innovative applications 
In the next section we offer specific roles with operational examples for peacekeeping troops in pursuit of 
win wm solutions
Win Wm Roles for U.N Peacekeeping Troops
Despite their inherent limitations and the constrained conditions under which they might be effective U.N 
peacekeeping forces can offer many opportunities that provide mutual benefits to disputants Some of those 
opportunities include peacekeeping troops employed as traditional interposition forces between hostile parues 
More often than not, however peacekeeping troops can be part of win win solutions only if applied in 
unconventional ways The most prom ment of these are outlined below
Trip-Wire
The first new role for U.N peacekeeping troops could be as a tnp-wire against surprise attack from either 
disputant In this role U.N peacekeeping troops would be placed in or near a defined border region The 
peacekeeping forces would monitor military movements m the area and serve as a mediator for any disputes that 
arose over the cease fire agreement Surprise attacks (by either protagonist) would have to pass through the 
peacekeeping forces thereby sounding an alarm for the international community and the country being attacked 
as well as taking the moral high ground away from the attacker The use of peacekeeping forces as a tnp-wire is 
not a new concept, indeed, it corresponds largely to the traditional roles assumed by peacekeeping missions 
What would be different m this proposed application is the deployment of peacekeeping forces pnor to (instead 
of following) the initial onset of armed conflict (Rikhye 1989) In this fashion peacekeeping forces exercise 
preventive diplomacy instead of acting as band aids for international crises that have already occurred.
The placement of peacekeeping troops as a preventive buffer offers benefits to all protagonists First the 
trip wire troops provide an early warning mechanism against attack that would not otherwise be present They 
also provide a moral and political disincentive for an opponent to attack Second peacekeeping troops assure 
that accidental engagements (which by definition neither side desires) do not occur because of the buffer or are 
reconciled without escalation
Third peacekeeping forces are considerably less expensive for the disputants than having their own troops 
stationed m the area With peacekeeping troops whose expenses are primarily borne by the United Nations the 
disputants can demobilize or reassign troops that might normally be stationed near that border area Finally 
United Nations troops would present neither a threat to the disputants (as might American or Soviet forces) nor 
would they favor one side s position over the other s In general the use of U.N troops as a tnp-wire is 
supenor to almost any other multinational arrangement and supenor to the status quo situation of proximate 
hostile forces
There are several potential contemporary applications of peacekeeping in this respect The substitution of 
allied troops in southern Iraq near the Kuwait border with U.N observers represents a similar circumstance Iraq
10
benefits by having the withdrawal of foreign forces that did so much damage to its land during the Persian Gulf 
War and it regains some of the sovereignty it lost Kuwait retains some of the protection it had with the 
Western troops (another Iraqi invasion would presumably prompt a similar Allied response) but it does not have 
to deal with the domestic regional and international problems that attend to having Western troops stationed in 
the area The United States Britain France and other states also benefit by having the financial and political 
burdens of large scale troop deployment m the area lifted
Peacekeeping troops might also be deployed as a tnp-wire in several other tense brad«- areas pnor to armed 
conflict Such troops might replace current unarmed observers in the Kashmir region of India as a buffer against 
Pakistan They might also be placed m northern Chad to form a deterrent to Libyan adventurism Finally one 
might even see peacekeeping troops positioned along the borders of China with Vietnam India, or the former 
Soviet Union in each of those cases the border areas are heavily militarized and have a history of violent 
confrontations and several wars
Election Supervision
We indicated above that peacekeeping operations would, in many cases experience difficulty in civil conflicts 
Yet they may play a constructive role benefitting all sides when they act to supervise elections intended to 
resolve internal conflict Resolving factional conflict in a state by democratic elections is becoming more 
common popular sentiment rather than force of arms then decides which groups will control the government 
United Nations peacekeeping forces would be charged with several tasks in the electoral supervisory process 
First they would patrol the area in which the election is held seeking to limit campaign violence that has 
become common in many parts of the world Second and most importantly the peacekeeping forces would 
mom tor the election process to ensure that the fair and regular procedures were followed in effect they would be 
on hand to report (and thereby deter) ballot tampering or other irregularities on election day The peacekeeping 
force might also assume some government functions (e g local police patrols) in the transition period pnor to 
the election
Using peacekeeping troops as election supervisors is a win win solution that offers several advantages 
Presumably both sides desire an end to bloodshed and hence the agreement for elections Peacekeeping forces 
help ensure that fighting will not be renewed thereby jeopardizing peace agreements and perhaps costing the 
lives of thousands of supporters on all sides The presence of peacekeeping troops also prevents an opponent 
from manipulating election results or from using claims of fraud to invalidate or ignore those results should it 
lose In effect peacekeeping troops guarantee the legitimacy of the election Without peacekeeping troops 
conflict could be renewed during or after the election and both sides (even the election winner) could be worse 
off—the whole purpose of elections is to establish order and prevent extra-constitutional challenges to the 
government
The only completed case of peacekeeping troops serving m this capacity was in Namibia (see Jaster 1990 
for details) ° There peacekeeping forces kept a watch on South African troops and on indigenous forces to 
make sure that the election signalling Namibia s independence would go smoothly Despite some problems 
that peacekeeping operation was largely a success The same strategy might be applied to other states when 
warring groups agree to allow democratic elections The most obvious is Cambodia where four factions at the 
time of this writing have agreed to hold elections sometime in the future United Nations supervision of the 
elecuons would be supenor to any other arrangement, the United Nations Transnational Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) has been created to perform that function It is unlikely that peaceful elections could be held without 
such presence A regional force composed of interested states might cast doubts on the neutrality of the force 
and disrupt the process A similar problem was encountered m Liberia when one of the rebel groups questioned 
Ivory Coast s participation in an African multinational force arguing that Ivory Coast was partisan in its 
dealings with the Liberian civil war
6 There are of course some examples of observation forces acting as election supervisors League of Nauons observers conducted 
several plebiscites during the 1920s See Wainhouse (1966)
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Proposed agreements to end civil conflict and hold elections in El Salvador and Angola might also include 
peacekeeping provisions for election supervision The large flow of arms over the years into those countries and 
the tremendous political distrust among factions makes peacekeeping a virtual necessity as part of a win win 
solution to those conflicts
Humanitarian Assistance
A second possible win win role for peacekeeping troops in a civil conflict is providing humanitarian assistance 
(Gordenker and Weiss 1992) During many civil conflicts control over the country is split between the central 
government and various rebel groups Combined with the disorder caused by the civil war this prevents many 
essential services (e g food supply and medical care) from being delivered to the population and usually creates 
a flood of refugees as well There are international agencies (e g International Red Cross) that provide 
emergency assistance to these vicums Yet, such efforts are often hindered by the challenged government or by 
rebel groups out of a fear that relief supplies might fall into the hands of their enemy troops and contribute to 
the war effort
U.N peacekeeping forces could provide protection for relief agencies to ensure that the supplies would reach 
the affected populations without interference from the disputants This benefits all sides in the conflict as well 
as being optimal for the distressed population Under the aegis of a U N operation central government and the 
rebel forces are relieved of the burden of providing food and other assistance to those in the areas they control 
(and they also are relieved of the bad publicity attendant to pictures on CNN of starving children and emaciated 
adults) The affected population not only receives the supplies it needs but it also is likely to be provided with 
additional assistance as international donors will be more generous when they know that supplies will reach 
their mtended destination The assurance that food and medical supplies will go to affected populations benefits 
both sides
Several areas of the world tom by war and famine might benefit by the use of peacekeeping troops in this 
fashion Sudan in the middle of a civil war at this writing seems to be urgently in need of this solution 
Similarly problems caused by civil war m El Salvado- Sn Lanka and the Philippines could be alleviated by 
the U.N forces supervising and protecting humamtanan relief efforts
Arms Control Venfication
Another new role for peacekeeping forces that allows for mutual benefits is in arms control verification An 
essential part of a modem arms control agreement is that each party must be assured that the other signa tones 
will live up to the terms of the agreement or at least that violations will be detected early enough to permit a 
timely response Not surpnsingly it has often been disagreements over the venfication procedures that have 
sidetracked or derailed arms control agreements rather than conflicts over substantive provisions of those 
agreements
Peacekeeping forces offer the potential to be a verifying agency for arms agreements Most conventionally 
peacekeeping forces might venfy troop reductions or withdrawal within a given area Traditional peacekeeping 
operations have performed this role in the past as m the Israeli and Egyptian disengagement following the Yom 
Kippur War (UNEFII) A more innovative activity could have peacekeeping forces performing on site 
inspections one could envision that they might supervise the destruction of weapons or venfy that troops levels 
and weapons deployment are within prescribed limits The most ambitious use of peacekeeping personnel in 
arms control venfication involves aenal surveillance (Krepon and Tracey 1990) There peacekeeping forces 
would be equipped with their own planes satellites radar and other intelligence gathenng mechanisms to venfy 
arms agreements through international technical means
The use of international peacekeeping troops for venfication offers several advantages over national 
venfication One might expect that achieving arms agreements that are in the self interest of all parties will be 
easier if the option of international peacekeeping venfication is available Furthermore all sides are provided 
with unbiased estimates of arms control compliance rather than relying on what may be varying politically
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motivated internal reports (e g the phantom missile gap” of the late 1950s and early 1960s) Accordingly 
there are likely to be fewer disputes over verification Moreover peacekeeping forces provide mechanisms to 
resolve disputes when they do occur
Peacekeeping operations m arms control verification also lessen the fear of espionage that accompanies the 
gathering of information in another country National on site inspectors are likely to be tempted to gather other 
strategic information during visits to military installations National technical means may also be used to 
collect information m addition to that related to verification Verification by peacekeeping faces eliminates that 
possibility as information gathering is in the hands of neutral parties and involves only matters related to the 
arms control agreement.
As noted above peacekeeping forces have already performed this role in a very limited fashion (i e troop 
withdrawals as part of a cease fire agreement) Successful international arms verification has also occurred in a 
limited fashion The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspects nuclear energy facilities under 
provisions of the Non Proliferation Treaty in order to verify that nuclear materials are not diverted to weapons 
purposes Win win solutions in this area could be applied to almost any arms agreement in Europe that reduced 
troops or eliminated a class of weapons (indeed peacekeeping troops might have been suitable f a  verifying the 
recent INF Treaty) They might also supervise proposed bans on chemical weapons production In either case 
and dozens of more hypothetical situations peacekeeping forces could insure that the agreement is faithfully 
executed (as both sides desire) without the accompanying intrusion common to national means of verification
Naval Peacekeeping
Another innovative role f a  peacekeeping faces might be as a naval patrol Previously peacekeeping 
operations have been almost exclusively land based except for some instances of helicopter reconnaissance 
U N personnel could be deployed o i ships flying under the U N flag Duties might include escorting neutral 
shipping through dangerous waters m a war zone This would discourage belligerents from attacking neutral 
shipping or coiducting illegal search and seizures in international waters UJN forces could also conduct mine 
sweeping operations in the contested area
A naval peacekeeping force might also play a role in the verification of naval treaties (Rikhye 1989) For 
example it could verify those provisions of the Sea Bed Arms Control Treaty which prohibits the placement of 
nuclear weapons on the ocean flo a  It could play a similar role with regard to regional arrangements such as 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco which established a nuclear free zone in Latin America, the peacekeeping face  could 
verify that signatory states did not place nuclear weapons m the sea bed beneath their territorial waters
With respect to naval peacekeeping during an oigoing war a U.N operation would be preferable to any 
multinational operation a  no international effort at all United Nations flagged escorts would not be suspected 
by the disputants of performing strategic roles which might exceed the immediate peacekeeping requirements 
this would not be the case for example if the United States Navy assumed an escort role In addition it would 
be less likely given the acceptance of a U.N naval force by all the parties to raise concerns of national 
sovereignty stemming from incursions into territorial waters The international community as a whole benefits 
from ensuring the continuation of commerce m a war tom area and by limiting the potential for war expansion 
the combatants avoid a situation in which both sides lose by having supplies cut-off and their economies even 
more adversely affected by war
Naval peacekeeping by the United Nations has never been tried ? but it was first suggested during the Iran 
Iraq war When attacks by Iran and Iraq against each other s naval targets and tankers irrespective of the latter s 
registry escalated Kuwait made an appeal to the United Nations for protection of neutral shipping The United 
States and other countries responded unilaterally to this request by reflagging ships and providing escorts for 
them through the Persian Gulf The Soviet Union and other states in the immediate area grew apprehensive of
7 There have been some minor incidents of U N peacekeeping forces assuming a naval rede UNEF I included a Landing Ship Tank 
which provided practice for troops loading and unloading personnel and vehicles on beaches The UNSF also had five coastal 
vehicles that provided supplies to the peacekeeping troops and the local population
the large Western naval presence and unsuccessfully argued for a U N  force to replace national navies in the 
area. Among the unfortunate incidents was the shooting down of an civilian Iranian airliner by a U S Navy 
ship that mistakenly thought it was under attack Had U N  naval peacekeeping faces been in the area it is 
unlikely that this incident and other attacks on Gulf shipping would have occurred, or at least been as numerous 
Naval peacekeeping might be a win win application in similar conflicts that threatened the safe passage of 
shipping through a given area (e g Suez Canal Panama Canal)
Drug Interdiction
Another new use of peacekeeping forces as a win win solution involves their use m stopping the production and 
distribution of narcotics (Rikhye 1989) United Nations troops could be used to search for and destroy fields of 
opium and coca this could include aerial surveillance as well as ground operations Presumably the U N 
troops would work in conjunction with local authorities in the mission Peacekeeping forces might also 
monitor air and sea traffic in and over international waters that are known corridors for drug transit.
The use of peacekeeping forces as drug enforcers represents a positive sum game for countries that grow 
most of the narcotics as well as for those that provide markets for the products Host countries frequently 
cannot eradicate illegal crops on their own Yet getting direct assistance (e g personnel and equipment) from 
narcotic consuming states typically causes senous domestic political problems the host government is often 
criticized for relinquishing its sovereignty and under such conditions drug lords are able to make nationalistic 
appeals against drug eradication efforts United Nations peacekeeping troops can provide the necessary 
assistance but without the political costs associated with outside intervention
Similarly states with a large drug market may not want to devote the resources necessary for drug 
eradication efforts in other states Furthermore efforts to stem the flow of drugs in or over international waters 
pose certain legal and jurisdictional problems Even without those barriers the military establishment m those 
states is often ill trained and reluctant to assume drug interdiction missions far from home A peacekeeping 
force offers a professional cadre of drug fighters armed presumably with international legal authority Drug 
consuming states are also spared the criticism that often stems from their efforts to curb the supply of drugs 
when little corresponding effort is made to temper demand
The disputes that the United States has had with Colombia Peru and Bolivia might be ameliorated if U N  
peacekeeping troops were introduced into the drug war Those efforts might also be more effective than weak 
national programs financed by the United States Similarly the golden triangle in Asia, crossing several 
national boundaries seems a good target for peacekeeping and drug interdiction
Conclusion
Intervention by the United Nations is by no means guaranteed success Furthermore its primary mechanism for 
intervention peacekeeping may not be an appropriate solution for all conflict that threatens international peace 
and security Nevertheless U N  peacekeeping operations offer the potential to alter the joint outcomes of many 
conflicts m such a way that all parties and the international community are better off than through any other 
mechanism
We have noted that traditional applications of U N  peacekeeping have produced some favorable results but 
have not always provided wm win solutions for the protagonists Our first contribution has been to specify the 
conditions under which U N peacekeeping is most likely to produce win win solutions We aigue that U N  
peacekeeping will most likely lead to all sides being better off when used to implement agreements in dyadic 
interstate conflicts between equally matched opponents At first this may seem to limit seriously the use of the 
peacekeeping strategy Yet we have discussed several new roles (e g humanitarian assistance election 
supervision) for U N peacekeeping troops that can transcend these limits We also note several other 
applications of peacekeeping strategy that offer the potenual for benefit&ng all sides to a conflict including 
affected third parties These include roles in arms control verification naval peacekeeping and drug interdiction 
A common aspect of all these roles is that they provide collective goods over and above any that might be
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provided by the conflicting parties or by any third party that might be involved Because of this peacekeeping 
operations may lead to outcomes that exceed the best initial expectations of all the parties involved
United Nations peacekeeping operations have failed to reach their potential because of two key problems 
One is their misapplication to situations for which they are inappropriate There is an increased nsk that this 
mistake may be repeated in the future given calls for a new international order ” and an enhanced role for the 
United Nations includes suggestions for peacekeeping troops in a variety of contexts A second problem has 
been the use of peacekeeping troops only in traditional roles established by the UNEFI precedent We believe 
that our analysis has demonstrated that U.N peacekeeping troops have great potential for generating joint 
positive solutions to international conflicts This is possible only if we recognize the limits of their 
applicability on the one hand and expand the horizons of their roles on the other
References
Diehl Paul (1988) Teacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace ” Political Science Quarterly 103 485 
507
Garvey Jack. (1970) ‘United Nations Peacekeeping and Host State Consent ” American Journal o f 
International Law 64 241 269
Gordenker Leon and Thomas Weiss (eds ) Soliders Peacekeepers and Disasters New Y ak  St Martin s 
Press
Goertz Gary and Paul Diehl (1992) Territorial Changes and International Conflict London Routledge
Haas E rnst (1986) The United Nations and Collective Management o f International Conflict New York 
United Nations Institute f a  Training and Research
James Alan (1990a) Peacekeeping m International Politics London Macmillan
_______ (1990b) International Peacekeeping The Disputants View ” Political Studies 38 215 230
Jas ter R obot (1990) ‘The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South W eston Africa ” Adelphi Papers 
voi 253 London Brassey s
Krepon Michael and Jeffrey Tracey (1990) Open Skies and UN Peacekeeping ” Survival 32 251 263
Mackinlay John (1989) The Peacekeepers London Unwm Hyman
N w afa Azrnna (1970) United Nations Use o f Force m Internal War Conditions fo r the Maintenance o f 
International Stability Ph D dissertation University of Michigan Ann A rb a University 
Microfilms
Nelson Richard (1984) Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model ” 
International Affairs 61 67 89
Rikhye Indar Jit (1989) The Future of Peacekeeping” International Peace Academy Occasional Papers on 
Peacekeeping no 2 New York. International Peace Academy
Rikhye Indar Jit, Michael Harbottle and Bjorn Egge (1974) The Thin Blue Line New Haven Yale 
University Press
United Nations (1990) ‘United Nations Peace Keeping ** (brochure) New Y ak  U N Department of Public 
Informatiai
Wainhouse David (1966) International Peace Observation Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press
This publication is supported in part by a grant 
from the John D and Catherine T Mac Arthur 
Foundation and is produced by the program in 
Arms Control, Disarmament, and International 
Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana 
Champaign
The University of Illinois is an equal 
opportunity/affirmative action institution
